

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

734-CAGWU

31 August 1951

SUBJECT: Cypress De-briefing

TO: Chief, ZAGactus
Washington, D.C.

Attn: []

INFO: Chief, ZAGactus
Munich, Germany

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REF: 724-CAGWU
596-CAGWU

1. It has come to our attention that further comment on the results of the Cypress team de-briefing is quite in order. Foremost is the fact that the revelations are not at all startling. They do not uncover any condition or event that is entirely unknown, but, rather, confirm or complete much information already possessed. HFIend has been pleased to learn first-hand that our general and final briefings have been reasonably accurate. The experiences of Cypress (granted, they were experiences gained in a very short period of time) tend to cement the fragmentary intelligence garnered over the past year or more. Probably, the outstanding observation that can be made from the de-briefing is that of the utterly deplorable living conditions, undoubtedly worse than when Hexter urged a token drop of bread (5766 dtd 1 June) and when the suggestion of propaganda supply drops was made early in July.

2. Next, the de-briefing points up (a) the growing uselessness of gold and other currency and, conversely, the increasing value of barter items; (b) intensified measures against infiltrations - searches, etcetera; (c) discontent with HTNeigh, both from the standpoint of the team and from the view of native Batmen who look for deeds rather than words; (d) growing abhorrence of court house politics as practiced by HTNeigh, and a longing for genuine liberation that involves neither the TPRoach nor the LGFlakes; (e) an expressed disdain on the part of the population for HTNeigh teams who arrive without HTNeigh officers; (f) and the abject failure of the Motorola set. The frustration of operating under stress, and being able to receive but not send, can be vividly imagined. So now, can the feelings be known of the teams that were dropped since November 1950 and since have either disappeared or defected to Keovil. Cypress chose to return to HFIend, a challenge more difficult than a trek across the TPRoach border.

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3. According to [] 0315, Lyceum was informed of the July infiltration three days before its actual staging. Cypress seems to confirm this counter-intelligence. The team reported that a BGCypsy reception awaited their drop. However, the team dropped some 3 1/2 miles from the pre-selected DZ into a village (one man landed on a doorstep); dogs barked and the aircraft roared and the villagers awoke. Naturally, a patrol was organized and the intruders hastened their exit, minus their equipment. [] accordingly, does not believe this particular instance indicates betrayal or previous knowledge. Rather, it is the normal machination of a police state. The stunning fact, however, that the families of two team members had been visited by BGCypsy-government officials with news of the arrival in LCBatland of their relatives three days before they actually appeared at their LCBatland homes is strong indication of previous knowledge. Contrary to the statement in paragraph 3 of [] 0315, HTNeigh most certainly knew of the operation. The military junta of HTNeigh selected the drop zones and picked the team members. The only vital information withheld was the date of the drop. Of the five infiltration operations effected by BGFicnd for ZACastus or ZACabin this was the first in which HTNeigh was allowed as much operational latitude as was given; and that was at the clamoring insistence of HTNeigh who even threatened to withdraw if the privilege were not granted and, then, continued to ridicule the BGFicnd operations staff. This affair, it must be added, was the first of these five operations to have broken security.

4. Further to this seemingly HTNeigh-inspired debacle in the July operation is the absolute refutation, in action, of the principles agreed in 596-CAGMU, BGFicnd's acceptance of the Military Junta's operational proposals. Obviously, paragraph 1-a is wrong for two reasons: (a) the premium placed on Junta intelligence was too high; and (b) the purposes of these partisan parties had not in any sense been diverted to operational objectives - politics rode supreme. Paragraph 1-c did not result in cooperation on any level; finger pointing and smoke screen allusions to the "elusive FJSnake mind" continue, as [] well can testify. Paragraph 1-d resulted from HTNeigh's representations which proved hopelessly false when Cypress adamantly denied any agreement with HTNeigh's team selections. Cypress also proved that area knowledge was not considered more closely when HTNeigh selected the teams, but, apparently political knowledge was.

5. The above represents, more or less, the culmination of a long series of everlasting interferences - the final blow - that gave BGFicnd no other recourse but the proposal to eliminate the executive body of HTNeigh ([] 7001), or, itself, be eliminated along with the capabilities and objectives of the BGFicnd mission.

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